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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Today, immigration constitutes one of the most politicised topics in Western-European 
politics. Although concerns about the issue can be found across the political spectrum, right-
wing populist parties are usually the most vocal anti-immigration actors. These parties have 
become one of the most disruptive forces in Western-European politics of the twenty-first 
century.1 This has not always been the case: the rise of anti-immigration parties started in the 
1980s, with very different degrees of success.2 The Dutch Centrumpartij (Centre Party) and its 
follow-up the Centrumdemocraten (Centre Democrats) – both under the leadership of Hans 
Janmaat and collectively referred to as the Centrumstroming (Centre Movement) – had 
limited electoral support as they never managed to gain more than 3 out of 150 seats in 
Parliament. The Centre Movement emerged in 1980 and disintegrated at the end of the 
1990s. This failure is quite surprising, as circumstances in the Netherlands were favourable 
for the emergence of an anti-establishment and anti-immigration party.3 After losing all seats 
in 1998, the Centre Democrats were succeeded by the much more successful Lijst Pim Fortuyn 
and Partij Voor de Vrijheid in the 2000s.4 
The movement had to deal with a lot of resistance as it was politically excluded by a 
cordon sanitaire and widely considered as a racist5 and neo-fascist party.6 Its main political 
activity – anti-immigration politics – was considered as a political ‘taboo’ during most of its 
 
1 Many scholars have tried to explain the rise of anti-immigration populist parties in Western-Europe. Political 
scientist Timo Lochocki calls Front National and UKIP “perhaps the most influential political forces of the last 
decade” in ‘Introduction: How the Failed Political Messaging of Moderate Political Actors Strengthens Populist 
Radical Right Parties’, in The Rise of Populism in Western Europe: A Media Analysis on Failed Political 
Messaging (Springer International Publishing, 2018), 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62855-4. 
2 Piero Ignazi, ‘The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties.’, Party Politics 2, no. 4 (1996): 560, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068896002004007. 
3 “in feite waren de omstandigheden voor nieuwe en populistische partijen in de jaren tachtig en negentig 
gunstiger dan ooit” in Paul Lucardie and Gerrit Voerman, Populisten in de Polder (Meppel: Boom, 2012), 33, 
https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/files/17048821/2012_Gerrit_Voerman_Lucardie_Populisten_in_de_polde
r.pdf. 
4 Merijn Oudenampsen, ‘Explaining the Swing to the Right: The Dutch Debate on the Rise of Right-Wing 
Populism’, Right-Wing Populism in Europe, 2013, 191–208, http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472544940.ch-013. 
5 “De meeste bestrijders zagen de CP en CD in navolging van de Anne Frank Stichting echter als racistische 
partijen” in Jan de Vetten, In de ban van goed en fout: de bestrijding van de Centrumpartij en de 
Centrumdemocraten (1980-1998) (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2016), 266, 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/44139; Joke Kniesmeyer, De Crisis En de Nieuwe Zondebok. De 
Racistische Politiek van de Centrumpartij (Voorburg: Protestantse Stichting Bibliotheekwezen, 1982). 
6 Paul Taggart, ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, West European Politics 18, no. 1 (January 1995): 45, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389508425056. 
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parliamentary existence.7 The leader of the movement, Hans Janmaat, always claimed to be 
breaking that taboo, as he presented the continuous settlement of migrants in the 
Netherlands as a symptom of the disintegration of society. Striking is the similarity between 
his and current populist narratives of crisis that present ‘hyper-immigration’ as the cause of 
‘cultural destruction’.8  
The success or failure of these parties can be attributed to several factors. In the case 
of the Centre Movement, three important causes of its limited electoral success can be 
deduced from the available literature. First, the movement mainly attracted protest-votes 
due to the lack of a decent or ‘normal’ character that would attract voters based on 
ideological proximity.9 Second, political exclusion removed the need for political compromise 
or moderation of its agenda, perpetuating its radical character.10 Third, the party started to 
lose issue-ownership over immigration, as the issue became increasingly politicised and put 
forward by more reputable mainstream political actors.11 
Much of the recent literature on the Centre Movement focusses on outside 
conditions: the bestrijding (combating) of the movement that sometimes turned violent.12 
Older work on the party itself paid special attention to racist traits and expressions of its 
provocative political messaging.13 The internal functioning of the Centre Movement remains 
understudied, as more intricate strategies were developed within the movement, and applied 
throughout its parliamentary existence. This thesis contributes to the existing knowledge of 
the Centre Movement by revealing the strategies behind its attempts to mobilise support. 
The movement had to find ways to ‘sell’ its anti-immigration ideas and legitimise itself as a 
viable political actor. In order to understand this process, it is necessary to look at both the 
 
7 Vetten, In de ban van goed en fout, 268. 
8 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 73. 
9 Wouter Van Der Brug, Meindert Fennema, and Jean Tillie, ‘Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others 
Succeed: A Two-Step Model of Aggregate Electoral Support’, Comparative Political Studies, 2005, 565, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414004273928. 
10 Joost Van Spanje and Wouter Van Der Brug, ‘The Party as Pariah: The Exclusion of Anti-Immigration Parties 
and Its Effect on Their Ideological Positions’, West European Politics 30, no. 5 (November 2007): 1034, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380701617431. 
11 Wouter Van Der Brug, Meindert Fennema, and Jean Tillie, ‘Anti-Immigrant Parties in Europe: Ideological or 
Protest Vote?’, European Journal of Political Research 37, no. 1 (2000): 95, 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007013503658. 
12 Vetten, In de ban van goed en fout; Joost Niemöller, De verschrikkelijke Janmaat: Nederland en de 
Centrumpartij (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij van Praag, 2015). 
13 Kniesmeyer, De Crisis En de Nieuwe Zondebok; Kees Brants and Willem Hogendoorn, Van Vreemde Smetten 
Vrij. Opkomst van de Centrumpartij (Bussum: De Haan, 1983); Jaap Van Donselaar, Fout na de oorlog. 
Fascistische en racistische organisaties in Nederland, 1950-1990 (Amsterdam: B. Bakker, 1991). 
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internal communication of the party, as its external communication. The main questions that 
this research tries to answer are: What communication strategies did the Centre Movement 
develop in an attempt to mobilise support throughout its existence? And why were they 
unable to break out of the margins of politics? Of prime importance to this research will be 
the language of the ‘face’ of the Centre Movement: Hans Janmaat. As leader of both the 
Centre Party and the Centre Democrats, Hans Janmaat was pulling the strings of the 
movement’s organisation and enjoyed the most attention in the media.14 This thesis can 
provide a better understanding of how ‘marginal’ parties such as the Centre Movement 
operate. It reveals how the movement carefully constructed its messages by balancing 
provocation and moderation, and how the limited possibilities for growth were the result of 
its paradoxical nature as a protest movement. 
 
Theoretical framework 
On the ‘demand’ side of politics, Western societies provided fertile ground for the emergence 
of right-wing populist and anti-immigration parties around 1980.15 Although the Centre 
Movement could also be regarded as a populist party, due to its strong anti-establishment 
character, I will refer to the Centre Movement as an ‘Anti-Immigration Party’ (AIP). This is 
because the language and populist demands by Hans Janmaat were less prominent than his 
nationalism.16 Furthermore, the term AIP allows us to regard the Centre Movement as part 
of a larger wave of ideologically diverse parties, but that has opposition to immigration at 
their ideological core.17 While the political scientist Meindert Fennema demonstrated the 
utility of the term ‘anti-immigrant parties’, I will use the slightly adjusted ‘anti-immigration 
party’ like political scientists Joost van Spanje and Wouter van der Brug.18 Nevertheless, its 
populist character will be taken into account, as “populist anti-party sentiment” was a 
 
14 “Despite the reasonably democratic formal structure, Janmaat has dominated the CD completely from the 
moment he joined the party.” In Cas Mudde and Joop Van Holsteyn, ‘The Netherlands: Explaining the Limited 
Success of the Extreme Right’, in The Politics of the Extreme Right. From the Margins to the Mainstream, ed. 
Paul Hainsworth (London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2000), 150, 
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781474290975. 
15 Piero Ignazi, ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution. Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in 
Europe’, European Journal of Political Research 22, no. 1 (1992): 3–34, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-
6765.1992.tb00303.x. 
16 Lucardie and Voerman, Populisten in de Polder, 190. 
17 Meindert Fennema, ‘Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-Immigrant Parties in 
Western Europe’, Party Politics, June 2016, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068897003004002. 
18 Van Spanje and Van Der Brug, ‘The Party as Pariah’. 
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recurrent theme in the movement’s language.19 The Centre Movement’s ‘populist’ character 
will be understood as the continuous discursive dichotomisation of society into the “pure 
good people” versus anyone that threatens their “volonté générale”, who can be understood 
as – but are not limited to – the “corrupt elite”.20 In order to understand how AIPs operate, it 
is necessary to understand why they emerged around 1980 in Western Europe and set out 
the necessary conditions for their persistent electoral success. 
An important cause for the rise of AIPs are the value changes that developed in 
Western societies since the 1960s: Ronald Inglehart called this development the ‘Silent 
Revolution’. According to him, Western societies would gradually become more post-
materialist and progressive due to post-war economic growth.21 This theory has been further 
elaborated by Piero Ignazi, who argued that the Silent Revolution was accompanied by 
another, less visible, response, that he called the ‘Silent Counter-Revolution’: a part of society 
allegedly felt threatened by the rise of progressive values, and in response wanted to bring 
back tradition, impose restrictions on immigration, and increase order.22 Such demands 
would eventually materialise as anti-immigration parties and affect conservative parties in 
the 1980s. 
Second, since the 1970s Europe saw increased voter mobility and a decline of party 
identification – closely related to the so-called Silent Revolution that destabilised party 
systems.23 The rise of catch-all and cartel parties, characterised by closed bureaucratic 
organisation and loose party identities, led to a “crisis of legitimacy” where voters were 
prevented from having a say in political decision making.24 Such an apparent ‘crisis of 
legitimacy’ has created specific demands that made “anti-system” parties more appealing, 
including anti-immigration parties.25 
 
19 Cas Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 138, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt155j8h1. 
20 Cas Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition 39, no. 4 (2004): 543, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x. 
21 Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics 
(Princeton University Press, 1977), https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt13x18ck; Roger Eatwell and Matthew 
Goodwin, National Populism. The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy (London: Penguin Random House UK, 
2018), 235. 
22 Ignazi, ‘The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties’, 557. 
23 Ignazi, ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution. Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in 
Europe’, 4. 
24 Ignazi, ‘The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties’, 555. 
25 Ignazi, 558. 
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Third, economic crises in the 1970s led to a crisis of the welfare state: the rise of 
neoliberalist ideas to respond to this crisis, combined with the challenge of New Politics, led 
to a ‘radicalisation’ of conservative parties, resulting in neoconservatism.26 In the 1980s this 
caused polarisation of the party system and saw conservative parties’ agendas move to the 
right.27 Because conservative parties abandoned extreme positions after being elected into 
power, AIPs were able to claim those positions, legitimised by conservatives.28 Therefore, 
anti-immigration parties were then able to fill in this newly created political cleavage on the 
‘supply-side’ of politics. 
Fourth, and unsurprisingly, immigration as a political issue had to become salient in 
order for anti-immigration parties to emerge. To different degrees, Western-European 
countries saw demographic change as a result of high levels of immigration, which politicised 
the issue further through time – especially combined with the recession of 1980.29 However, 
the cause of issue-saliency of immigration is difficult to assess, as explanations run in different 
ways. For example, countries that experienced similar economic shocks show very different 
degrees of success of their AIPs.30 Furthermore, societies with high levels of ethnic 
heterogeneity do not necessarily apply policies that negatively affect migrants.31 Although the 
causes of saliency are not certain, the very presence of this issue-saliency is a necessary 
condition for the emergence of AIPs.32 Issue-saliency can partly be achieved by parties 
themselves, as political entrepreneurs are necessary for the mobilisation of support33 by 
‘problematising’ the issue.34 Then, societies where immigrants were perceived as a cause of 
 
26 Ignazi, ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution. Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in 
Europe’, 20. 
27 Ignazi, 20. 
28 Ignazi, 21. 
29 H.L.M. Obdeijn and Marlou Schrover, Komen En Gaan. Immigratie En Emigratie in Nederland Vanaf 1550 
(Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 2008), 302, http://hdl.handle.net/1887/17762. 
30 Van Der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie, ‘Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed’, 567. 
31 Tim Reeskens and Wim van Oorschot, ‘Disentangling the “New Liberal Dilemma”: On the Relation Between 
General Welfare Redistribution Preferences and Welfare Chauvinism’, International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology, June 2012, 132, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715212451987; Jeroen Van Der Waal, Willem De 
Koster, and Wim Van Oorschot, ‘Three Worlds of Welfare Chauvinism? How Welfare Regimes Affect Support 
for Distributing Welfare to Immigrants in Europe’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and 
Practice 15, no. 2 (April 2013): 178, https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2013.785147. 
32 Vetten, In de ban van goed en fout, 51. 
33 Ignazi, ‘The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties’, 559; Waal, Koster, and Oorschot, ‘Three 
Worlds of Welfare Chauvinism?’, 178. 
34 Marlou Schrover and Willem Schinkel, ‘Introduction: The Language of Inclusion and Exclusion in the Context 
of Immigration and Integration’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 7 (July 2013): 1126, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013.783711. 
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economic hardship or as a threat to the nation-state, provided fertile ground for the 
emergence of an AIP. 
Then there are three conditions that can explain the different degrees of persistent 
success of AIPs in Europe: issue-ownership, ideological attractiveness and partisan 
collaboration. First, it is important that an AIP enjoys issue ownership, with as little 
competition as possible: the electoral success of an AIP will particularly be difficult if the 
“main-stream right-wing conservative party” increasingly adopts the immigration issue in its 
political agenda.35 Research shows that the adoption of immigration issues by the main-
stream right-wing conservative party is detrimental to the electoral success of AIPs due to 
their ideological proximity.36 
Second, in order to be electorally attractive to voters, an AIP needs to be considered 
as a ‘normal’ party. That is, it needs to have a clear ideological profile that attracts votes based 
on “ideological proximity and policy considerations”.37 The alternative to an ideologically 
motivated vote is a protest vote: such votes can only be helpful for a party in the short term 
because they are exclusively intended to “scare the elite”.38 The bigger a protest party 
becomes, the less desirable it will be to cast a vote for it.39 A very narrow, anti-immigration 
ideology will make ideological proximity with voters more difficult, and hence affects a party’s 
attractiveness. Political scientist Paul Taggart observes the difficulty of such a narrow agenda: 
he subdivides ‘far-right parties’ into ‘New Populist’, and ‘neo-fascist’ parties, and links the 
marginal election results of neo-fascist parties to their narrow anti-immigration ideology, and 
the success of New Populist parties to their broader – hence more appealing – ideological 
profile.40 
Third, the actions of other parties will affect a party’s potential: if an AIP with extreme 
party positions is excluded politically, it will remain extremist.41 On the other hand, 
collaboration with other political parties forces an AIP to adopt more moderate policy 
 
35 Van Der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie, ‘Anti-Immigrant Parties in Europe’, 94. 
36 Wouter Van Der Brug and Meindert Fennema, ‘Protest or Mainstream? How the European Anti-Immigrant 
Parties Developed into Two Separate Groups by 1999’, European Journal of Political Research 42, no. 1 (2003): 
70–71, https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00074. 
37 Van Der Brug and Fennema, 59. 
38 Van Der Brug and Fennema, 57–58. 
39 Van Der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie, ‘Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed’, 542. 
40 Taggart, ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, 48. 
41 Van Spanje and Van Der Brug, ‘The Party as Pariah’, 1037. 
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positions.42 So, an AIP needs to ‘own’ the issue of immigration in order to have electoral 
success. If an AIP is already ‘too extreme’ (i.e. a narrow anti-immigration ideology), it will fail 
to gain electoral potential and may mostly attract (short-lived) protest votes. Political 
exclusion will perpetuate such an extreme position and can continue the marginality of such 
a party. These conditions heavily limit the possibilities for growth of an AIP within a 
parliamentary system. The political influence of a ‘protest AIP’ will be limited to signalling to 
mainstream parties that some voters are deeply dissatisfied with current policies. Then, in the 
most favourable scenario, a politically excluded protest AIP influences the policies of 
mainstream actors due to its inability to escape the margins of the opposition. 
 
Historiography 
The first publications on the Centre Movement are relatively hostile and reflect a sense of 
concern in Dutch society. In 1982, Joke Kniesmeijer, a prominent author of the Anne Frank 
Foundation – an important actor against anti-Semitism and racism – published a booklet titled 
The Crisis and the New Scapegoat: The Racist Politics of the Centre Party, and argued that the 
party was definitely racist, but not fascist due to the absence of anti-democratic goals, 
although it was difficult to be sure, because the ‘civil’ face of the party, could conceal a more 
radical reality.43 
A similar argument was made in a book published in 1983: Free from Foreign Taint: 
The Rise of the Centre Party. Political scientist Kees Brants and anthropologist Willem 
Hoogendoorn were quite alarmed about the supposed impact of the movement on Dutch 
politics: “With the entry of the Centre Party in the lower house, the boundary of socially 
acceptable answers might have shifted.”44 The authors believe that votes for the Centre Party 
can be considered as racially-motivated, that mainly come from the impoverished 
neighbourhoods in the major four cities, where workers saw themselves increasingly compete 
over housing and jobs with migrants.45 
The anthropologist Jaap van Donselaar wrote about both the Centre Party and the 
Centre Democrats in 1991. Similar to Kniesmeijer, Van Donselaar noticed similarities between 
 
42 Van Spanje and Van Der Brug, 1037. 
43 Kniesmeyer, De Crisis En de Nieuwe Zondebok, 18. 
44 Brants and Hogendoorn, Van Vreemde Smetten Vrij, 112. 
45 Brants and Hogendoorn, 42-44. 
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the language and fascist tendencies of the NVU and the Centre Movement. Van Donselaar, 
therefore, suspected the Centre Democrats of having a hidden neo-fascist ‘face’. The Centre 
Movement would try to appear civil on the “frontstage”, but it would act a lot more radical 
internally on its “backstage”.46 As mentioned above, in 1995 political scientist Paul Taggart 
took a similar standpoint and defined the Centre Democrats as a “neo-fascist” party, due to 
its narrow anti-immigration ideology.47 
In 1998, political scientists Cas Mudde and Joop van Holsteyn studied the ‘extreme-
right’ Centre Movement. According to them, the Centre Party differed from the Centre 
Democrats, as the latter developed into a single-issue party, based on an analysis of party 
programmes.48 Two years later, Mudde makes a similar conclusion in an analysis in his book 
The Ideology of the Extreme Right. Here, he argues that the ideology of the Centre Democrats 
mainly revolves around “the idea that people should live in a mono-cultural state which is not 
crowded by too many inhabitants.”49 
Political scientist Meindert Fennema prefers to define the Centre Party and Centre 
Democrats as “anti-immigrant parties”.50 Extreme right parties do not always fit neatly on a 
left-right scale, and neither does the Centre Movement, which considered itself “as ‘neither 
left nor right’”.51 In 2000, 2003 and 2005, political scientists Wouter Van Der Brug, Meindert 
Fennema and Jean Tillie,52 looked at the electoral failure of ‘anti-immigrant parties’ and came 
to the same conclusion about the Centre Democrats: they attributed the failure to the lack of 
an attractive ideological profile, based on the great deal of protest votes it attracted in the 
European election of 199453 and 1999.54 
The above-mentioned Wouter Van Der Brug also published with political scientist 
Joost Van Spanje: they argue that the parties were excluded from politics because they were 
 
46 Van Donselaar, Fout na de oorlog. 
47 Taggart, ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, 45. 
48 J. van Holsteyn and C. Mudde, ‘Extreem-rechts in Nederland’, 1998, 46, 
https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/publications/extreemrechts-in-nederland(77084d95-9fae-4d41-abcc-
2885b0c1a06d)/export.html. 
49 Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right, 141. 
50 Fennema, ‘Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western 
Europe’, 472. 
51 Fennema, 479. 
52 Tillie was not a co-author in 2003  
53 Van Der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie, ‘Anti-Immigrant Parties in Europe’; Van Der Brug and Fennema, ‘Protest 
or Mainstream?’ 
54 Van Der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie, ‘Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed’. 
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perceived as undemocratic by other parties.55 Furthermore, this political exclusion caused the 
Centre Democrats to remain extreme, as lack of the need for political compromises kept it 
‘frozen’ in its extreme position.56 
Recently two books were dedicated to the Centre Movement. The first book De 
Verschrikkelijke Janmaat by journalist Joost Niemöller released in 2015, emphasises the unfair 
treatment of the movement as it was heavily under fire – the best example being a violent 
attack on the movement in 1986.57 The book generally does not approach the subject in a 
scientific way, but it is valuable for its detailed archival reconstruction of the Centre 
Movement’s history. As opposed to the strong criticism by most other writers about the 
Centre Movement, Niemöller claims that Hans Janmaat was not necessarily verschrikkelijk 
(terrible) as he and his movement had no chance to be successful politically due to unfair and 
biased treatment by the media, anti-fascist groups, political parties and the judicial system.58 
The back of the book describes the mentality in Dutch politics around that time as 
‘embarrassing’. 
A year later, historian Jan de Vetten promoted with his dissertation Under the spell of 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ – Combating the Centrumpartij and the Centrumdemocraten (1980-1998). 
De Vetten argues that the party was firmly contested, also outside of the Parliament in the 
form of negative press, lawsuits, demonstrations and sometimes even violent actions.59 
During the Centre Movement’s presence in parliament, immigration became increasingly 
politicised, especially in the 1990s by the liberal-conservative (VVD) leader Frits Bolkestein.60 
While De Vetten provides evidence that the party was often treated in almost undemocratic 
ways, he is reluctant to condemn those actions. Furthermore, De Vetten does not take any 
notice of the publication by Joost Niemöller, thereby missing some opportunities to provide 
a more nuanced reconstruction of events. 
Taking into account the aforementioned knowledge on anti-immigration parties and 
the available literature on the Centre Movement, it is understandable that the movement 
failed to get out of the margins. According to the literature, it was regarded as a racist, or 
 
55 Van Spanje and Van Der Brug, ‘The Party as Pariah’, 1030. 
56 Van Spanje and Van Der Brug, 1037. 
57 Anti-fascists attacked a meeting in Kedichem between the Centre Party and the Centre Democrats in Mudde, 
‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, 123–24. 
58 Niemöller, De verschrikkelijke Janmaat. 
59 Vetten, In de ban van goed en fout. 
60 Vetten, 86. 
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even neo-fascist party, that attracted mostly protest votes, making its ideological 
attractiveness questionable. Second, the movement had to deal with increased electoral 
competition over its single issue in the 1990s. And third, the party was firmly combated both 
inside and outside of parliament, presumably causing it to remain extreme and a political 
‘pariah’. Despite the wealth of literature on the Centre Movement, it is unclear how the 
Centre Movement tried to respond to this constant pressure. Taking a closer look at the 
movement’s internal communication can provide a better understanding of how the Centre 
Movement tried to operate from its marginal position. 
 
Methodology and sources 
In order to make the immigration standpoint appealing, the Centre movement had to 
‘problematise’ it: a crucial strategy of such problematisation is ‘expanding’, described by the 
historian Marlou Schrover and sociologist Willem Schinkel as a political strategy to inflate one 
issue by ‘linking’ it with other issues in society.61 This is done through ‘frames’, which “are 
series of claims, topics or themes, strung together in a more or less coherent way, whereby 
some features of reality are highlighted and others obscured so as to tell a consistent story 
about problems, causes, moral implications and remedies.”62 
In addition to this, it was important for the movement to present itself as a ‘normal 
party’ as it was constantly receiving ‘racist’ and ‘fascist’ accusations. Anti-elitist claims can be 
employed for this, in order to delegitimise other (political) actors and to present oneself as 
the ‘only’ viable alternative to solve the countries’ problems. These aspects will be analysed 
in both external and internal communication. By doing this, this thesis can explore how similar 
strategies were employed during the Centre Movement’s existence but adapted to specific 
contexts. 
Similar to the political scientist Cas Mudde, I will analyse both ‘externally oriented’ 
communication and ‘internal oriented’ communication.63 While Cas Mudde tried to uncover 
the ‘ideology’ of the Centre Democrats, I will expand his research by lengthening the period 
of analysis to include the early Centre Party and by analysing different sources that can 
provide a more detailed perspective on the internal elaboration of strategies. Communication 
 
61 Schrover and Schinkel, ‘Introduction’, 1129. 
62 Schrover and Schinkel, 1129. 
63 Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right, 21. 
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within the movement can reveal what considerations, discussions and ideas preceded their 
actions. 
External communication is produced by the movement itself or is a conscious attempt 
to directly communicate information to the wider public. Party programmes have been taken 
into account from the Centre Party (General Election of 1982 and the European Parliament of 
1984) and Centre Democrats (General Elections of in 1989, 1994 and 1998).64 But because 
these fine-tuned examples of external communication are limited in nature, more diverse 
sources were necessary. Such insights have been provided by sources from the Binnenlandse 
Veiligheidsdienst (Homeland Security, BVD). The Argus Foundation managed to obtain these 
documents through legal proceedings with Dutch authorities.65 The BVD has infiltrated and 
followed the Centre Movement for at least nine years (1980-1989). In addition to meeting 
minutes, these documents contain valuable external communication such as local party 
propaganda, newspaper clippings and draft election programmes. Newspaper articles 
collected by the BVD have mainly been supplemented with newspaper articles in the online 
archive of Delpher.66 Finally, parliamentary behaviour can provide an additional ‘level’ of 
external communication. Due to the astronomic size of parliamentary minutes available 
online, this thesis has been limited to a selection of 59 pages of parliamentary minutes that 
are included in the ‘Janmaat archive’ at the International Institute of Social History (IISG) in 
Amsterdam. These documents start in 1992 and reveal how Janmaat directly communicated 
with his political opponents. 
In terms of internal communication, I will use the meeting minutes created by agents 
of the BVD and the party magazine CD-Actueel. The meeting notes were gathered by the BVD 
from the start of the Centre Party in 1980, through to the Centre Democrats in 1989. The 
notes describe both local and hoofdbestuur (main board) meetings. Local political gatherings 
can hardly be regarded as separate from the higher-level meetings because it was mainly 
Hans Janmaat pulling the strings within the entire organisation.67 Although these notes 
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provide a valuable look inside the party, the names of speakers are often redacted as part of 
the declassification process. Furthermore, these documents are not a neutral reflection of 
inter-party dynamics, as the notes were biased. Janmaat even accused the BVD of trying to 
sabotage the party from the inside out.68 Nevertheless, these sources can provide a unique 
view by a third party of the internal party discussions. 
The Centre Movement has produced several magazines. In the first place there is CD-
Actueel, distributed among members from 1988, until late 1993. Second, there was CD-info. 
According to political scientist Cas Mudde, CD-info was “more sketchy and up to date than 
CD-Actueel, as well as more sloppy in language and typing errors”.69 Mudde argues that CD-
info mainly differed “in goal and substance: Only CD-info carries information on internal party 
matters”.70 Despite this claim by Mudde, he considers party magazines in general as 
“internally oriented”.71 Therefore, CD-Actueel can still provide a view of the ideas within the 
party. The Centre Democrats themselves support the claim that that the magazine is a 
reflection of ideas within the party. The introduction of the first copy of CD-Actueel reads: 
“The aim of our party magazine is to reflect the ideas that live in our party.”72 This magazine 
has also been consulted at the ‘Janmaat archive’ of the IISG in Amsterdam. The combination 
of both external and internal communication by the Centre Movement from 1980 to 1998, 
can provide insights into the intricate strategies behind its communication with the 
electorate, in an attempt to mobilise support. 
 
Structure 
Before the analysis takes place on primary sources, I briefly discuss the period that is relevant 
for the understanding of the topic: the history of migration in the Netherlands and migration 
politics between 1945 and 2000. This background chapter looks at the societal impact of 
migration after the Second World War and the emergence of the ‘multicultural society’. 
Furthermore, it describes the changing nature of Dutch immigration politics and the increased 
politicisation and problematisation of migration. These were the conditions that the Centre 
Movement was responding to. 
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The analysis of primary sources will be divided into three chapters, based on key 
moments that have influenced the movement’s organisation and character. First, I look at the 
Centre Party, starting in 1980 when the party was founded, until party leader Hans Janmaat 
was discharged in October 1984. The next chapter looks at the Centre Democrats, the party 
that was founded by Hans Janmaat – while still holding on to his single seat in parliament – 
directly after his expulsion from the Centre Party. Janmaat allegedly supported a more 
‘moderate’ course in the party.73 The ‘original’ Centre Party (later revived as CP’86) and the 
Centre Democrats now competed with each other locally and on the national level, despite 
several attempts to come to a merger. Both parties failed in the general election of 1986, but 
the Centre Democrats succeeded to get one seat in 1989. This is where the final chapter 
begins, at a time when the Centre Democrats seem to be much more successful, both 
nationally and locally, than CP’86. Gradually, the Centre Democrats manage to get more local 
seats and climb rapidly in the polls: at the end of 1993 they reached 5 per cent, the equivalent 
of eight seats in Parliament.74 Despite the optimistic indications, the party, ‘only’ managed to 
get three parliamentary seats in the general election of 1994, before rapidly disintegrating. 
Finally, a conclusion will discuss the results of the analysis and reflect on the wider 
implications of the observations.  
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Chapter 2: Post-War Migration and Immigration Politics in the 
Netherlands (1945-2000)  
 
In order to understand the climate that the Centre Movement was operating in, and the 
conditions it was responding to, this chapter will provide a brief history of post-World War II 
immigration, the evolution of immigration politics in the Netherlands and the emergence of 
anti-immigration parties. After the Second World War, the Netherlands did not consider itself 
an immigration country; emigration was encouraged.75 After the Dutch East Indies became 
independent Indonesia, 400.000 ‘repatriates’ came to the Netherlands which was suffering 
from a housing shortage.76 Soon, however, the Dutch economy started growing rapidly, and 
by 1960 the Netherlands – like many other Western-European countries – was suffering from 
a shortage of workers in labour-intensive industries. 
After depleting European sources of labour, such as Italy and Spain, the Dutch 
government aided businesses by signing recruitment agreements in the 1960s with countries 
such as Morocco and Turkey.77 In the same years, other groups migrated to the Netherlands, 
namely from the former colony of Suriname and Dutch territories in the Caribbean. The ‘guest 
workers’ from Morocco and Turkey were regarded as a temporary solution to deal with 
economic fluctuations.78  
The Dutch government mostly took a laissez-faire approach to these developments, 
leaving businesses free to control the recruitment process and even allowed clandestine 
immigration – the so-called spontanen.79 Their name ‘guest workers’, illustrated the wider 
assumption that these workers would eventually return to their countries of origin. Their 
labour was welcome, but their settlement was undesirable. 
The Dutch government and businesses provided various types of support for migrants 
in the Netherlands, such as subsided housing and by creating jobs for expatriates.80 
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79 Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, Vijf eeuwen migratie. Een verhaal van winnaars en verliezers (Amsterdam: 
Atlas Contact, 2018), 136. 
80 Obdeijn and Schrover, Komen En Gaan, 239, 247. 
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Sometimes, businesses provided seemingly better contracts to guest workers, who were 
provided with housing, travel compensations and extra days off.81 Such initiatives were 
sometimes met with resistance and feelings of unequal treatment by the native Dutch 
population. 
While the ‘expatriates’ enjoyed relatively little trouble to become part of Dutch 
society, the Surinamese migrants and the non-European guest workers had more trouble. 
This was strongly affected by the time of their settlement: In 1955 there was a labour shortage 
while the 1970s were characterised by economic recession and high unemployment.82 
Around 1974, the recruitment of foreign workers ended.83 In the meantime, most Italian and 
Spanish guest workers had repatriated due to better conditions at home, and free movement 
of workers within the EEC (European Economic Community) made future return relatively 
easy.84 On the other hand, more restrictive immigration policies made a future return for 
Turks and Moroccans impossible, who started to use the possibility of family unification 
instead.85 Like the guest workers, Surinamese migrants settled in a time with few employment 
possibilities and for whom restrictive immigration policies also started to apply.86 
Unemployment at the time was the highest since the Second World War: between 1979 and 
1983 it tripled to 10,2 per cent.87 
This combination of high unemployment and mass-immigration fuelled anti-
immigration sentiments.88 While migrants were first not considered as a great threat, the 
start of economic crises fuelled the sense that migrants were taking advantage of the wealth 
in the Netherlands.89 Furthermore, the visibility of Turkish and Moroccan migrants in society 
started to increase in the 1980s when families came over.90 Some geopolitical events such as 
the Rushdie-affair in 1989 and the Gulf War greatly changed views on migrants and Islam.91 
 
81 Obdeijn and Schrover, 266. 
82 Obdeijn and Schrover, 263. 
83 Obdeijn and Schrover, 268. 
84 Lucassen and Lucassen, Vijf eeuwen migratie, 166. 
85 Lucassen and Lucassen, 143. 
86 Obdeijn and Schrover, Komen En Gaan, 255. 
87 CBS, ‘Werkloosheid jaren dertig hoogste ooit’, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, accessed 20 June 2020, 
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2009/12/werkloosheid-jaren-dertig-hoogste-ooit. 
88 Lucassen and Lucassen, Vijf eeuwen migratie, 180. 
89 Obdeijn and Schrover, Komen En Gaan, 302. 
90 Obdeijn and Schrover, 302. 
91 Obdeijn and Schrover, 303. 
 19 
While the number of refugees started increasing in the 1970s, the real growth in 
numbers started in the 1990s.92 The Netherlands was often unable to handle the many 
requests, causing long and costly procedures of increasing numbers of asylum seekers – who 
were unable to work due to their status. This led to more resistance from the Dutch society 
towards migrants.93 In the 1990s, the Netherlands was the second-most popular destination 
for refugees in Europe.94  
 
The evolution of immigration politics 
The Netherlands saw its demographic composition change quickly throughout a couple 
decades. In this changing climate, the response of the Dutch government went through 
different policy phases. The first years of post-war labour-migration from Mediterranean 
countries were characterised by the absence of any structural approach to their integration 
in Dutch society and a high degree of delegation of responsibilities to newly established 
migrant foundations.95 The 1960s and 1970s were dominated by the “return idea”: the 
conviction that non-Western migrants in the Netherlands would return home, and the 
needlessness of integrating them in Dutch society.96 To prevent permanent settlement, the 
government encouraged cultural preservation.97 For example, newly founded immigrant 
organisations received government subsidies for ‘cultural activities’.98 This was part of 
multiculturalism, which emerged in the 1960s “as an ideology and as a policy for managing 
the cultural diversity that resulted from increased immigration to Western countries, or as a 
way to avoid coping with change.”99 Immigration politics in the 1970s and 1980s depended 
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highly on scientific research for the formulation of integration policies, which suggests little 
politicisation and a high delegation of policymaking to scientists.100  
Although political actors all agreed that the permanent settlement of these ‘guest 
workers’ was undesirable, their approaches differed. The VVD encouraged the stay of guest 
workers in society, as this would be good for economic growth.101 Unions and the political left 
were more critical of immigration, as the saturation of the supply of workers limited the 
unions’ negotiation power.102 The unions eventually agreed to temporary employment 
contracts.103 This mainly affected left-wing voters, as migrants put pressure on limited 
housing in lower-class neighbourhoods of large and industrial cities.104 
The 1980s saw the widespread realisation that these migrants would permanently 
settle in the Netherlands. With the institutionalisation of the multicultural perspective, the 
preservation of cultural identities became seen as a steppingstone for integrating into a 
‘multicultural’ Dutch society.105 Multiculturalism can be regarded as a continuation of the 
Dutch pillarisation tradition, which meant that society was divided into different religious 
groups and subcultures, to allow different groups to live side by side.106 Outspoken criticism 
towards immigration was close to a taboo: in the 1980s, political parties agreed that any 
partisan objection towards immigrants would provide legitimacy to racist parties.107 
It was only in the 1990s that mainstream parties started to take a visible and critical 
stance against the effects of migration on Dutch society. This was epitomised by an opinion 
piece from the conservative-liberal party leader Frits Bolkestein in 1991 of the VVD, who was 
critical of the illiberal aspects of Islamic culture.108 The 1990s and 2000s saw an end to a 
multiculturalist approach, and the creation of an assimilation policy, as the preservation of 
one’s own cultural identity, especially Islamic, became regarded as an obstacle for 
integration.109 Influenced by alarming news reports about orthodox Islam in the Netherlands, 
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the agendas of the political establishment moved to the right, as they adopted more critical 
views on immigration and Islam.110 
So, in contrast to the 1970s and 1980s; in the 1990s the depoliticised and scientific 
policy phase was replaced by one with strong politicisation and “the selective use of scientific 
expertise”.111 This evolution was strongly influenced by perceived cultural problems in Dutch 
society and politics, which were not reflected by scientific research, leading to the emergence 
of the assimilationist policy.112 Similar to  developments in the rest of Western Europe, 
between 1960 and 2000 “immigration has moved from ‘low politics’ to ‘high politics’”.113 
 
Anti-Immigration Parties in the Netherlands 
The 1980s saw the emergence of right-wing populist parties in European democracies – with 
different degrees of success. The first Dutch extreme-right party, the Nederlandse Volks-Unie 
(NVU) was established in 1971, but its “aggressive” anti-immigration campaigns attracted 
neo-Nazis and led to a marginal existence.114 The NVU was classified as a criminal organisation 
in 1978.115 The historian Henry Brookman and some former NVU members started the 
Nationale Centrum Partij in December 1979, which only existed briefly: after an attack on 
Moroccan guest workers without a legal status who found refuge in a church in Amsterdam, 
the party was disbanded the next day.116 The party rebranded itself as the Centrumpartij 
(Centre Party). The party failed to get into parliament with the election of 1981, but in the 
early elections of 1982, for the first time since the Second World War, “a party that was 
generally considered to be right-wing extremist” managed to win a parliamentary seat.117 
Getting a foothold in parliament was challenging but holding onto it and retaining 
interparty stability has proven to be almost impossible for both the Centre Movement and 
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other new parties on the political stage. Telling examples are the first anti-elitist party the 
Boerenpartij (Farmer’s Party) from 1963 to 1981, the right-wing split-off DS’70 from the 
Labour Party from 1971-1981, and the Algemeen Ouderen Verbond (General Elderly Alliance) 
from 1994 to 1998. Despite some surprising election-results in their prime time – the Farmers 
Party seven seats, DS’70 eight seats and the AOV six seats – they all suffered from internal 
disagreements, which led to a quick disintegration of the parties.118 The same ‘curse’ seems 
to apply to the Centre Movement, which suffered a similar fate. 
The Centre Party’s political manifesto of 1982 provides insight into the ideology and 
goals of the party. Political scientist Cas Mudde describes the first manifesto and response of 
society as follows: 
 
It contained ten points which were a remarkable combination of right-wing (law and 
order), left-wing (protection of social benefits), and green (protection of the 
environment and animals) standpoints […]. It was the tenth point, however, that 
would be the centre of attention in the following years: ‘The Netherlands is not an 
immigration country, so put a stop to the stream of foreigners.’ This, together with 
the political history of some of its early members, was the main reason that the media 
portrayed the CP from the outset and consistently as an extreme right party, despite 
the party’s fierce rejection of any accusations of racism and fascism.119 
 
As soon as the Centre Party entered parliament, it was ignored and widely considered as a 
radical movement. In the meantime, the party encountered internal disagreements about its 
ideological course and struggles for power.120 The founder of the party, Henry Brookman, had 
to step to the background of the party due to his job at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.121 
In 1981, the Centre Party elected the relatively unknown and inexperienced politician Hans 
Janmaat as their party leader. Janmaat had earlier been active for the Katholieke Volkspartij 
and DS'70, where he failed to gain a high position due to his defiant attitude.122 Janmaat 
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opposed a more radical and militaristic direction of the party. On the other hand, the ‘radical’ 
wing opposed Hans Janmaat’s single-issue direction for the party, with too much emphasis 
on immigration.123 Aggravating conflict, Janmaat discredited his colleagues in the press and 
was accused of financial mismanagement and even illegitimate use of party funds, which led 
to his expulsion from the party.124 Janmaat held on to his seat and started a new party, the 
Centre Democrats (CD). In the meantime, the original Centre Party was declared bankrupt 
and revived as CP’86. Both parties failed to get a parliamentary seat in the 1986 election, but 
Janmaat’s Centre Democrats managed to return in parliament with one seat, after early 
elections in 1989. The Centre Democrats started to attract wider support in 1993 when they 
managed to gain 77 seats in municipal elections.125 
The positive electoral results of the Centre Democrats in the 1990s were possible due 
to a complex mixture of factors that caused “latent dissatisfaction” in society.126 Of crucial 
importance for the Centre Democrats were the societal changes, primarily in big cities, due 
to the increasing visibility of immigrant-cultures.127 Furthermore, the seeming convergence 
of political parties in the early 1990s, made it harder to distinguish ideological differences.128 
The polls were increasingly positive about the Centre Democrats and suggested that the party 
could get eight seats in parliament in the elections of 1994.129 
But like other young parties, this euphoria was quickly replaced by a downfall: there 
were several convictions for CD members for racist statements.130 The party ‘only’ managed 
to obtain three seats in 1994. The same year, undercover journalists infiltrated the party and 
recorded shocking racist and anti-Semitic conversations behind closed doors.131 The most 
shocking scandal was the recording of a local CD-representative in Amsterdam Yge Graman, 
who claimed to have set fire to a rehab-clinic for Surinamese drug addicts, for which he later 
was sentenced to prison.132 The party quickly disintegrated as many representatives on the 
municipal level left. The party disappeared from parliament in 1998 when the party lost all of 
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its seats. The ‘face’ of the extreme-right in the Netherlands, Hans Janmaat, was soon replaced 
by the much more successful sociologist Pim Fortuyn towards the 2000s. In contrast to the 
Centre Movement, Pim Fortuyn’s party (LPF) did attract voters based on ideological proximity 
as opposed to mere dissatisfied protest voters.133 Then, the Centre Movement never enjoyed 
the same reputation as its successors which affected its ability to mobilise strong and 
persistent support. 
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Chapter 3: The Centre Party (1980-1984) 
 
From the outset, it is clear the Centre Party was operating in a hostile environment. The first 
registered BVD-documentation of a meeting by the Centre Party, that should have taken place 
on the 23rd of May 1980 in Utrecht, was disturbed. The Centre Party had announced the 
meeting publicly in a local newspaper, but this had attracted the attention of around 100 
protestors, among whom members of the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN), which 
prevented the meeting from taking place.134 The documentation of the BVD reveals that the 
Centre Party wanted to continue to hold their meetings publicly, as they kept announcing 
them in newspapers. These meetings were repeatedly disturbed by demonstrators. 
A telling announcement was published in the newspaper the Haagsche Courant on 
November 27, 1980, titled “The Netherlands is too full!!!”, with the question: “Can we in our 
country, with free speech and freedom of assembly, organise a meeting? You will get the 
answer at the public meeting of the board of The Hague when Drs Janmaat will discuss the 
political situation.”135 The announcement was made to divert opponents, as the actual 
meeting took place in a different location than mentioned: opponents gathered at the 
announced ‘Hotel Babylon’, and destroyed some windows there, while the ‘real’ meeting took 
place at ‘Hotel Bel Air’.136 
The provocative way that the CP ‘invites’ opponents to their meetings seemed to be 
an attempt to obtain an ‘underdog’ position through publicity. At a meeting in Amsterdam in 
February 1980, disturbances of an upcoming meeting are expected: An unknown participant 
points out: “an important journalist from Algemeen Dagblad will report positively at the 
possible disturbance of the meeting.”137 In a report, the BVD also noticed how the party 
seemed to be “looking for problems” by distributing provocative advertisements and stickers 
while acting surprised about the invited response from opponents.138 The party makes 
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attempts to present itself as a ‘civil’ party. On the internal level, however, the party 
premeditated actions that invite opposition from opponents in order to attract publicity. 
 
Ordedienst 
In response to the continuous disturbances of meetings by the Centre Party, discussions start 
to emerge about founding an ordedienst (order service). In January 1981, members discussed 
the possibility of founding such a service with youngsters. Such proposals were met with 
strong opposition.139 At a later main board meeting in March 1981, the party does not want 
to formally establish an order service but is in favour of having young people at meetings 
amongst the attendees.140 In December that same year in Arnhem, attending young people 
claim that they have established a knokploeg (roughly translates to ‘assault group’, or ‘mob’). 
According to the meeting minutes, this assault group is now part of the CP, will be trained by 
a sports teacher (also a member of the party) and will be deployable nationwide.141 
It remains unclear to what extent this group was actually deployed: At a board 
meeting in February 1982, the prominent party member Nico Konst believed that public 
meetings should continue and that the Centre Party needed a zaalwacht (hall guard).142 Later 
on, the service seems to become a reality, as attendees propose a “defensive character” for 
the service, and equipping them with military boots.143 The first report of their presence by 
the BVD is registered on April 9, 1982, consisting of 10 men between 20 and 30 years of age, 
dressed in blue suits.144 The radical and militarised image of such a security service starts to 
concern some members of the party: on the 10th of May 1982, one attendee at a meeting 
wants to abolish the service, as it puts the CP “on the same line as the NVU”, while Janmaat 
is still in favour of such a group due to continuous assaults by opponents.145 
The service quickly proofs to threaten the image of the party: A large fight breaks out 
in Leiden in September 6, 1982, two days before the general election between the ‘service’, 
described by the BVD as “consisting of 30 to 40 skinheads”, and opponents.146 On December 
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15, 1982, the BVD similarly reports the presence of “several skinheads” at a meeting in 
Rotterdam,147 and “plus-minus 100 ‘Skinheads’” at a meeting two days later in Amsterdam at 
the Krasnapolsky hotel.148 
On 23 December 1982, bad publicity about the party is welcomed by party members 
after the escalations, as any form of publicity is considered beneficial.149 By 1984, however, 
the BVD reports signs of “absence of homogeneity” within the party’s leadership: the cause 
of this is a disagreement between the supposed “moderate” and “extreme-right” currents.150 
Not only opposition to the ordedienst creates conflict: Janmaat is accused of financial 
mismanagement.151 The national newspaper NRC announced that a more militaristic current 
of the party is in favour of an ordedienst.152 The parliamentary staff (led by Janmaat) sends 
out a letter to the main board of the party on the 27th of August 1984, distancing itself from 
the radicalisation within the party as described in the press.153 Allegations of Janmaat’s 
financial mismanagement and accusations to other party members in the press lead Janmaat 
to be discharged from the Centre Party in October 1984.154 
The internal discussions about the party’s ‘order service’ reveal how actions of the 
party were strongly influenced by worries about its external image. Members were worried 
that the service would provide legitimacy to opponents’ accusations of racism and fascism. 
This has caused disagreements about the right course of action and has contributed to the 
eventual rupture in the Centre Party: the militaristic character of such a service was so 
threatening to the party’s image, that Hans Janmaat even decided to ‘betray’ his fellow party 
members to save his reputation – as earlier meeting minutes reveal that Janmaat himself was 
in favour of the order service. 
 
  
 
147 Argus, BVD, cp-01-04, Minutes of the Centre Party’s closed meeting in Rotterdam on 15 December 1982, 
28. 
148 Argus, BVD, cp-01-04, Minutes of the Centre Party’s meeting in Amsterdam on 17 December 1982, 32. 
149 Argus, BVD, cp-01-04, Minutes of the Centre Party’s meeting in the house of a member [name redacted by 
the BVD] on 23 December 1982, 44. 
150 Argus, BVD, cp-02-06, Quarterly report by the BVD of the 1st quarter of 1984, 31. 
151 Argus, BVD, cp-03-01 Minutes of the Centre Party’s main board meeting in the Hague on 4 May 1984, 10. 
152 Argus, BVD, cp-03-02, Minutes of the intelligence services weekly ‘Aurora’ meeting of 5 June 1984 , 32.   
153 Argus, BVD, cp-03-05, Written statement of the Centre Party’s parliamentary staff directed at the party’s 
main board on 27 August 1984, 24. 
154 Argus, BVD, cp-04-01, Minutes of the intelligence services weekly ‘Aurora’ meeting of 16 October 1984, 16. 
 28 
A ‘normal’ party? 
Not only is the ordedienst controversial, the party actively tried to distance itself from all other 
forms of radicalism. At the congress in Utrecht, the party decided to not use a four-leaf clover 
as the party’s symbol, as “this evokes extreme-right sentiments”.155 On August 27 1982, the 
party bans several members due to their side activities for controversial organisations, which 
could too easily lead to fascist allegations; at the same meeting, a person who kept dressing 
in black is also banned.156 In order to deal with accusations of racism, a letter shared with 
party members provides careful answers to difficult questions by the press.157 One member 
at a meeting says that the CP needs to find a way to lose the “fascist label”.158 
Despite being aware of their bad image, and the attempts to distance themselves from 
radical figures and organisations, the Centre Party and its members are still seen as engaging 
in strange behaviour and associating themselves with questionable figures. The BVD 
continuously reports foul language at the party’s meetings: it is described as “language that 
would scare the ‘normal’ citizen”159 and as “very racist”.160 Furthermore, the party continues 
to attract radical figures: the ‘skinheads’ that protected the CP in their meeting in Amsterdam 
on December 1982, also distributed their own propaganda. A BVD-report shows stickers with 
the text “Blacks Acquitted Whites Committed – Fight for white rights”.161 In June 1983, people 
who were distributing flyers for the CP in Arnhem were also caught with violently 
discriminating pamphlets against Turks. The pamphlet demanded Turks to leave the city 
before August and threatened that their property would be seized, their children shot, their 
women raped, and the men hanged.162 After house searches by the police, the distributors 
turned out to be active CP members.163 Janmaat also makes problematic claims in the 
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meetings, such as that “all Turks need to bugger off if they don’t like it here”164 and that 
abortions should be allowed, as it can halt the population growth of minorities.165 In one of 
the meetings, participants discussed a court decision that prohibited one of the CP pamphlets. 
Janmaat disagreed with the decision and the party decided to take a tougher stance in the 
future, as the pamphlets will be put in “harder language”.166 
Political scientist Mudde had already stressed the Centre Party’s “fierce rejection of 
any accusations of racism and fascism”, 167 and these reported incidents and activities suggest 
that the CP was distancing itself ‘just enough’ from radical figures to save their image. 
However, the claims that the Centre Party was very racist and radical miss the crucial fact that 
the Centre Movement was very aware of this reputation, and that they also held back. On the 
other hand, claims from authors such as Joost Niemöller about the seemingly unjustified 
hostilities towards the party are difficult to recognise, given the legitimate concerns about 
the radical character and behaviour of some members and associates. These observations 
show that the Centre Party had a seemingly necessary relationship with radical figures. 
 
The ‘pure good people’ versus the elite and Others: 
The Centre Party has a clear anti-elitist character from the beginning. Delegitimising other 
political actors is a recurring strategy. The CP paints an image of combatting certain enemies: 
In a locally spread pamphlet, the CP rejects pacifists – the “ultra-left” – with their ideas to get 
out of NATO, while the Soviets are building up their arms: “defending a safe Netherlands turns 
out to be a taboo, as well as the problem of the pouring in of foreigners”.168 This way, the CP 
connects the ‘ultra-left’ with immigration. 
Very telling about the party’s ideas is a report written by party member Danny Segers. 
It is unclear if this report was distributed publicly but it was collected by the BVD. The title 
reads: “State-dangerous leftist groups take power without war”. 169 In the report, Segers 
analysed municipal programmes of three left-wing parties (PSP, CPN and PPR) and concludes 
that the antifascists should be regarded as the true fascists that are aiming for a dictatorship 
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and an undemocratic society. The report is filled with fear over the pacifying goals, that would 
facilitate terror and anarchy on the streets. The report ends with a warning for these “red 
fascists” who want to destroy society – “the enemy is among us”.170 Similar language towards 
the left is used in a flyer, distributed in Arnhem, that warns against “red-fascism”.171 In a 
pamphlet for local elections in Rotterdam (16 May 1984) the CP similarly targets its left 
opponents: the Labour Party (PvdA) is accused of spreading prostitution all over the city 
because it had prohibited the concentration of prostitution in a neighbourhood.172  
For the party, it is all about publicity. At a dinner to celebrate the CP’s first seat in 
parliament, Hans Janmaat shared his provocative strategy. According to Janmaat, publicity is 
the most important strategy for the party to grow: “Janmaat will seduce other MPs to throw 
curses at the CP”.173 The CP also sues its opponents, including the Communist Party of the 
Netherlands (CPN)174 and the Anne Frank Foundation, which Janmaat claims should attract 
“enough publicity”.175  
On the external level, the Centre Party was actively blaming left-wing parties and anti-
fascist organisations for problems in Dutch society and the threat that they pose for the 
country’s safety – this is clearly reflected in the distributed pamphlets. This way, warnings 
about the CP were redirected back to their source, and the enemies of the CP were accused 
of preserving a taboo. Immigration and pacifism were expanded to a wider view that left 
political elites are illegitimate. Internal discussions revealed that the party’s aversive attitude 
was not simply a symptom of its frustration but part of a more intricate strategy to provoke 
political elites into misbehaviour and to attract more publicity. The party’s seeming 
‘amateurism’ and Janmaat’s proactive attitude were not necessarily a sign of its nonchalance 
but were often premeditated actions designed to delegitimise opponents. 
 
Immigration 
Then there is the CP’s most important issue: immigration. The CP had to find ways to 
problematise immigration and to convert this controversial topic into an appealing point for 
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voters. The CP employed two strategies in an attempt to mobilise voters around immigration 
issues. First, local issues are expanded to the view that immigration and moral decay is a wider 
problem that haunts the nation. Second, it presented itself as a ‘normal’ party that just 
wanted to break a taboo. 
The strategy of expanding local issues is explicitly discussed in a meeting in Arnhem in 
December 1981. In response to the failure to gain a parliamentary seat in 1981, Nico Konst 
said that it happens often that a party cannot break through nationally, but that acting locally 
like the Socialist Party (SP) can benefit the CP: “Support local interest in order to win the 
hearts of the local population for the party.”176 At the same meeting, a pamphlet is discussed 
that is meant to attract party members in Nijmegen: It refers to a local youth centre called 
“Doornroosje”, where supposedly narcotics are being sold and used.177 Additionally, the 
pamphlet criticises “Café de Plak” where a monthly “paedophile-evening” is organised.178 
Similarly, at a later meeting, members are requested to join neighbourhood committees “in 
order to interest people for the CP.”179 
Another locally distributed pamphlet in Amsterdam for the Municipal elections of June 
1982 tells readers that new buildings will be constructed for the settlement of “a group that 
desires a completely different way of life without asking mobile-home occupants and 
residents if they wanted this.”180 The new inhabitants would not be charged a ground lease, 
which allegedly caused legal inequality. Such language against foreigners continued towards 
Muslims in the Netherlands: A pamphlet distributed in Arnhem criticises ritual slaughter in 
the “Rijnstraat/Ketelstraat”.181 In party propaganda, newspaper clippings are organised in a 
specific way to suggest a link between immigration and crime. For example, headings such as 
“More minorities” and “Taxi driver knocked down with brick” are printed next to each 
other.182 
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The issue of Islam got more attention internally. At a meeting, Janmaat warned for the 
fertility rate of Muslims: “In 18 years Islam will rule over Amsterdam”.183 In a draft version for 
the European Elections of 1984, collected by the BVD, “combating of Islamisation of our cities” 
is one of the party positions.184 However, It cannot be found in the final version for the 
European Elections.185 This threat of overpopulation is also cleverly wrapped in a local way 
for a local election in Rotterdam in 1984: “In Rotterdam, you can see and smell that in an 
industrialised country, overpopulation leads to acid rain, soil contamination and traffic 
chaos.”186 
The party emphasised its benign intentions and its adherence to democracy to justify 
its anti-immigration stance. A newspaper interview with Nico Konst, collected by the BVD 
reads: “As opposed to the NVU, we do not strive for ‘the swimming back’ of Surinamese, anti-
Semitism, racism, etcetera. The Centre Party has as its main goal, to democratically make 
negotiable the taboo around the foreigner problem.”187 Similarly, in a pamphlet for the 
municipal elections in Rotterdam, the party justifies: “It would be crazy to prohibit our party, 
as we are the only party that dares to stand up for the own population (…) and to do 
something about that in a democratic way”.188 In response to Joke Kniesmeijer’s accusations 
of racism in her critical booklet on the Centre Party (written for the Anne Frank Foundation), 
the party released a response in the party magazine Centrumnieuws. The Centre party 
believes that there is a profound ‘untruth’ in the booklet. The Centre Party is not racist, as 
both minorities and the Dutch are victims of national policies: “The national politics are the 
scapegoat, not the minorities.”189 Through this response, the CP cleverly distanced itself from 
racist allegations, despite its problematic focus on immigration. 
However, this focus on immigration started to become an issue within the party: at a 
meeting in May 1983, attendees discussed a television report on the Centre Party. The party’s 
main board wanted to give more attention to other issues, but “the foreigners still need to be 
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given the most attention.”190 In February 1984, this discussion started again: next time when 
the CP is on television, more attention should be given to “terror, unsafety, etc.”191 Nico Konst 
had big ambitions for the party. In the foreword of the party magazine CentrumNieuws he 
wrote: “The coming year we need to prove that we are endlessly more than what the press 
calls ‘a group of dissatisfied people’, but the fourth political current that wants to pull this 
country out of the swamp.”192 The last registered meeting by the BVD, before Janmaat’s 
dischargement from the party, took place on 28 September 1984 and clearly shows the 
ideological disagreement between Janmaat and Konst: Janmaat attributed the party’s success 
to its ability to “break open” population politics.193 According to Nico Konst, however, the 
party should become broader, with a better ideology to become the fourth political current, 
and “not a protest party”.194 
The impact on local communities was a recurrent focus of the Centre Party. Externally, 
the party used an expanding strategy to bring attention to local issues, which were implicitly 
linked to a wider sense of moral decay and the ‘threat’ of immigration in the Netherlands. In 
response to allegations of its racism, the Centre Party communicated its democratic and 
benign intentions. The party was also legitimising its own position as the only party that was 
addressing these issues. Internally, the party explicitly discussed its focus on local issues as a 
strategy to attract support. While the party was already discussing the issue of Islam 
internally, this issue did not fully surface in its external communication yet, perhaps due to 
the resistance that this would invite. Despite its seemingly discriminatory and provocative 
language, the party was careful not to go too far. By reflecting on the publicity that the party 
received, some party members concluded that there is too much focus on immigration. This 
prominence of the immigration issue caused disagreements within the party and together 
with other problematic behaviour of Hans Janmaat, he was expelled from the party.  
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Chapter 4: The Early Years of the Centre Democrats (1984-1989) 
 
After Janmaat is expelled from the Centre Party, he starts his own: The Centre Democrats, 
registered on November 7, 1984.195 The following years are characterised by competition 
between the Centre Party and the new Centre Democrats of Janmaat, despite some attempts 
to come to a merger. Janmaat still holds onto the parliamentary seat but risked losing this in 
the election of 1986. A major challenge for the Centre Democrats was the seeming 
incompetence of the entire Centre Movement after the rupture within the Centre Party. 
In order to gain members, which the CD now lacked, the party tried to communicate 
that it is not the CP. An early pamphlet, distributed in Delft, Rotterdam and Utrecht simply 
reads: “Centre Democrats support the member of parliament Hans Janmaat”.196 This strategy 
is explicitly communicated in a meeting: Janmaat says that the prominence of his name on 
the pamphlet is only meant to communicate the relationship with the Centre Democrats.197 
In a letter that is provided together with an ‘information package’ for prospective members, 
the CD emphasises that it is a “totally new party” and not a “continuation of the C.P”.198 
Because the Centre Party still had the rights to airtime on television and radio, the CD 
started to distribute cassette tapes with recordings of Hans Janmaat in Parliament around 
The Hague to promote him.199 At a meeting in May 1986, the tension between the parties 
became clear: Janmaat expected to lose his seat in the upcoming elections and therefore: 
“everything must be done to prevent Segers from getting into parliament.”200 The CD has 
frustrated the CP by registering the name Centre Party at the Kiesraad to disable them from 
using that name in future elections; the original Centre Party will have to use the name CP’86 
– which Janmaat also opposed.201  Both the CP and CD fail to obtain a seat in the general 
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election of 1986, and the original CP is declared bankrupt.202 The newly established CP’86 and 
CD took part in the provincial elections of 1987, unsuccessfully. Nevertheless, the CD is 
optimistic: At a meeting in April 1987, the results are called “hopeful”.203 
Despite competition, there have been attempts at reconciliation or even come to a 
merger between the two parties. In a meeting in October 1985, Janmaat still regarded 
cooperation possible, and local connections should not be ruled out.204 A meeting in 
Kedichem in March 1986 between the Centre Party and Centre Democrats turned into a 
disaster, as the participants were attacked by anti-fascists. One member of the Centre 
Democrats, Will Schuurman, lost her leg, as the hotel where they met is set on fire and many 
had no choice but to jump down from the first floor.205 This final attempt to merge on the 
national level failed and damaged the morale of both parties. Nevertheless, the CD was 
successful on the local level: some local representatives of the CP decided to join Janmaat’s 
CD. A meeting with local representatives of the CP in the Hague in August 1986, was 
characterised by unanimity, and the absence of any desire to work together with the original 
Centre Party.206 
During these years of competition within the Centre Movement, the CD had trouble 
to be taken seriously. In an attempt to reverse the incompetent image after the split-off from 
the CP, the Centre Democrats communicated externally that they were not the Centre Party. 
Within the CD, this distancing from the CP is explicitly communicated in meetings. These 
observations suggest that the Centre Democrats were aware of their added weakness: the 
association with the original Centre Party and a questionable reputation as a viable political 
actor. This is in line with the party’s earlier attempts at highlighting its own legitimacy by 
portraying its political opponents as illegitimate. 
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Similar Tactics 
The anti-elitist trend continued under the Centre Democrats. The violent attack by anti-
fascists in Kedichem of 1986, provided legitimacy to the Centre Movement’s claims about left-
wing violence. In their attempt to win a seat in the Provincial Elections of 1987, the CD had 
distributed a pamphlet that warned against left-wing “terrorism”, who would be supported 
by government subsidies to combat against NATO to make “our borders undefendable against 
a potential enemy” and even set fire to Dutch businesses.207 The threat of left-wing 
movements was connected to an ineffective ‘political elite’. According to the pamphlet, the 
PvdA would justify it, and the Christian Democrats (CDA) and VVD would be “too weak” to do 
anything about it.208 
Expansion also continued, most strongly and vividly with foreigners, who were linked 
to the unsafety of Dutch society. This was done by planning commemorations of crimes where 
foreigners were the perpetrators. For example, in April 1988, the party asked for permission 
to lay a wreath at a café, where five years earlier a Turk shot and killed five Dutch people.209 
Similarly, the CD wanted to demonstrate in Rotterdam in 1989 at a metro stop where three 
young women were stabbed to death by a Surinamese man.210 Using local events for publicity 
was explicitly justified at a meeting. Janmaat explained: “Localising a situation remains 
important”.211 However, the demonstrations by the Centre Movement were almost always 
forbidden.212 At a meeting, an unknown person noted that the commemoration in Rotterdam 
will not take place, as they will not let themselves get beat up “by a bunch of lefties”.213 This 
did not seem to be a problem for the party. The BVD notes “At least the announcement of 
the demonstration has provided enough publicity for the CD.”214 These observations within 
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the party suggest that provocative events were all part of the party’s goal to attract as much 
publicity as possible and that members were bluffing. 
Sometimes, expanding of immigration is done in less subtle ways. An example is the 
pamphlet text: “All guest workers and so-called refugees have to leave the country because 
their parasitic effect is detrimental to our economy and employment opportunities.”215 
Another example is the increased attention to infectious diseases like HIV. Noted explicitly in 
their party programme of 1989, the CD demands that refugees be checked for “the presence 
of infectious diseases”, thereby linking foreigners to a threat to public health.216  
Despite their seemingly radical language in some of their external communication, the 
Centre Democrats continued to distance themselves from extremism – not only visibly. In 
meetings, the party’s leadership hoped that in the future no NVU members will be able to 
join the party.217 Cooperation with the NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) was 
not deemed attractive, because “quite some extreme-right elements are in this group.”218 
Furthermore, contact with the Front National is weakening, because they were also in contact 
with the Italian MSI. Janmaat found the MSI too extreme: “Janmaat believes that the MSI 
points up their right om too quickly.”219 These clear examples of internal discussions show 
that the party continued to be careful with whom they associated. 
 
Policy and Language Shifts  
In the meantime, however, it becomes clear that there were certain language shifts since 
Janmaat has left the CP. The CD was becoming increasingly occupied with the threat of Islam. 
A controversial document by Drs Vierling, for internal use titled: “Basic principles protection 
of Dutch citizenship” contains a reference to Islam: “Islam will be provided space as a religion, 
but combated where the Islam does not acknowledge the separation between church and 
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state.”220 The Centre Democrats are explicitly against “ritual slaughter” in their party 
programme of 1989, while this remained absent from earlier election programmes.221 
Furthermore, an increased pragmatic side of the CD started to emerge: It sees an opportunity 
to force poor Dutch people to educate foreigners in Dutch “living habits” for those foreigners 
that do not emigrate.222 So, on the external level, the anti-immigration stance has become 
more visible, especially with regards to Islam. This is likely a result of the increased influence 
of Hans Janmaat. Journalist Joost Niemöller, for example, applauded Janmaat for being one 
of the first politicians to put Islam on the Dutch political agenda.223 
Although the Centre Party was more favourable of European integration, the Centre 
Democrats seemed to take more of an anti-elitist stance towards the EC (European 
Community) and international agreements.224 In a pamphlet, anti-elitism is now also directed 
abroad: “The fishermen are almost ruined. Now it’s the farmer’s turn.”225 Production limits 
would lead to milk shortages and inferior imports, causing farmers to commit suicide. “The 
EC is not at all a financially beneficial case for the Dutch population. We are only paying for 
international politicians.”226 In a pamphlet distributed in Wassenaar in 1988, the CD warns 
that the Dutch government will “lose control over finances” due to the events of “1992”, likely 
to refer to the Maastricht treaty.227 Furthermore, it is asking the upper classes of Wassenaar 
to vote for the CD, against international pressure, and “for [our] own business life”.228 These 
pamphlets were specifically targeted at fishermen, farmers or the upper-middle class. In the 
official party programme of 1989, such Euro-sceptic claims remain absent.229 These external 
messages to potential voters show that the targeting of specific groups was not always 
consistent with the party’s official positions. 
 
220 Argus, BVD, cp-04-04, Document for internal use by drs. Vierling titled ‘Basic principles protection of Dutch 
citizenship’, 4. 
221 RUG, RDCDPP, “CD (1989) Concept partij-programma”, accessed 24 June 2020, 
http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/553/. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Niemöller, De verschrikkelijke Janmaat, 72–74. 
224 The European Community is qualified as the ‘most successful European organisation’ in RUG, RDCDPP, “CP 
(1984) Europees programma.”, accessed 24 June 2020, http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/70/. 
225 Argus, BVD, cp-07-02, Pamphlet of the Centre Democrats dating from around December 1988, 58. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Argus, BVD, cp-07-02, Pamphlet of the Centre Democrats for ‘inhabitants of the villa districts’ of Wassenaar 
on 5 December 1988, 57. 
228 Ibid. 
229 RUG, RDCDPP, “CD (1989) Concept partij-programma”, accessed 24 June 2020,  
http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/553/. 
 39 
Lastly, the Centre Democrats made big statements about their own importance, 
especially towards to general election of 1989 – in contrast to the more careful Centre Party 
in 1980-1984. This is possibly a consequence of the political career of Hans Janmaat, who by 
now had four years of parliamentary experience. For example, the CD had distributed 
pamphlets in the Hague in December 1988 that highlighted the alleged influence that Janmaat 
has had on immigration: “Many foreigners are already being chased away, and we consider 
that a consequence of the performances of mister Janmaat when he was in parliament.”230 
 
Infiltration by the BVD 
Striking about the end of the eighties and the Centre Democrats is that the party started to 
become aware that they were being infiltrated by the secret service. In October 1986, the CD 
decided to act more carefully, and to not date and number invitations and minutes of 
meetings, “in order to obscure the view of opponents.”231 The pamphlet of the provincial 
elections of 1987 already reads that the party has been infiltrated by the BVD, allegedly as a 
response to Janmaat’s warnings about the erosion of democracy – due to leftist violence.232 
The CD accused the BVD of infiltration because it did not want the CD to cause unrest in 
society, and therefore created a “rupture” in the Centre Party.233 Meeting minutes from the 
BVD of April 1988 note: “According to Janmaat, the party is being infiltrated by the BVD. A 
person who was approached by the BVD, has directly gone to Janmaat and informed him 
about this interaction.”234 Janmaat announced that he wanted to receive as much publicity as 
possible about this occurrence.235 On a main board meeting in January 1989, Janmaat 
believed that the BVD is trying to infiltrate on a high level.236 Ironically, this claim by Janmaat 
is registered in the meeting minutes of the BVD. Finally, on the 16th of January 1989, Janmaat 
sent a letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs, requesting him to let the BVD seize their 
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activities.237 This is one of the last registrations of BVD activity within the Centre Democrats; 
meeting minutes by the BVD are no longer available after 1989. 
 The external communication of the Centre Democrats illustrate how they used the 
infiltration by the BVD as a sign of their own importance, and they presented it as the cause 
for conflicts within the Centre Party. This way the malfunctioning of the party was blamed on 
other actors. Within the party, it becomes clear that the BVD was following the party. Janmaat 
believed that a good strategy was to use the infiltration as a publicity stunt. Shortly after these 
occurrences, the Centre Democrats entered a new era: Janmaat has managed to get a seat in 
parliament for the second time in 1989. CP’86 has failed.  
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Chapter 5: The Rise and Fall of the Centre Democrats (1989-1998) 
 
In the last decade or so, the Centre Democrats experienced a volatile period that started 
optimistically but soon turned into decline. The party did increasingly well in the polls and 
managed to get three seats in parliament in 1994. On the other hand, the party had to deal 
with a changing political climate with increased politicisation of the immigration issue, and its 
reputation was increasingly damaged in the press. This final chapter pays special attention to 
the party magazine CD-Actueel, where ideas within the party were shared. Because these 
magazines are available from 1987 there will be a handful of observations that overlap with 
the end of the previous chapter. Parliamentary minutes are understood as the party’s 
external communication. Finally, due to the impact of media performances by Janmaat and 
shocking behaviour by party members in the 1990s, special attention will be paid to reports 
in the written press. 
 
Similar ideas: 
The party continued to present itself as a successful party. This inflated self-image seems to 
be amplified by increasingly positive signs in the polls between the year 1990 and 1994. In the 
forewords of CD-Actueel, the party continuously presents itself as a healthy party: the party 
tells readers that party membership is increasing steadily, and party funds are sufficient. 
Those with political power, “especially those on the PvdA-side” are allegedly afraid.238 In 
1992, two years before the general election, the CD believed that it will receive 10 seats and 
an upcoming hung parliament.239 That year, it believed that the situation changed for the 
party: “The CD is being taken more seriously.”240 Resistance to the party is portrayed as 
logical: “The fate of those who fight against the prevailing mentality in a certain era is usually 
not so rosy, even if it turns out that they were right afterwards.”241 
The party’s anti-elitism continued in broadly the same way, as it delegitimised anyone 
who was in power: The PvdA was still the main target of the CD, which was allegedly actively 
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destabilising society in cooperation with the CDA in order to make their socialist ideas more 
appealing.242 A sign of this alleged destabilisation is the fact that the PvdA wanted to put down 
defence expenses due to the decreasing Soviet threat.243 The fall of the Soviet Union was 
regarded as evidence that socialism is a failure and has no place in Dutch politics.244 In this 
time of party convergence, the CD criticised that voters have “no alternative than the three 
main parties.”245 In the eyes of the CD, the government wanted to perpetuate problems in 
order to provide each other with jobs: “behind the scenes, it’s all about occupying posts and 
jobs, the policies remain the same.”246 The media was also condemned. Allegedly, like the 
Soviet Union, there is censorship in the Netherlands that prohibits journalists to mention the 
foreign descend of criminals247 and there is a tendency to play down numbers of 
immigration.248 The violent attack in Kedichem of 1986 was also taken as an example of biased 
media, as the public broadcaster NOS had captioned a picture of Janmaat incorrectly, who 
was accused of fleeing the scene.249 
Despite attempts at profiling itself as a green party, the Centre Democrats criticised 
nearly all the environmental initiatives by its political opponents. They argued that the newly 
established GroenLinks and other parties that started to get involved in the environmental 
issues, were only using it for “their own popularity”.250 Furthermore, the main issue (CO2) 
was portrayed as unnecessary: CO2 is a benign gas, “necessary for the growth of plants”.251 
The CD wanted to see more attention for toxic spills in nature and believed that the global 
warming-argument was being abused in order to levy higher taxes.252 The motor vehicle tax 
was allegedly used for the housing and maintenance of asylum seekers.253 
The CD continued its strategy of linking local issues to immigration. For example, a 
fight between kids escalated to “a cultural conflict” as allegedly 300 people joined the fight in 
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The Hague.254 In Amsterdam, Surinamese people had allegedly joined the police force with 
ease but turned out to be members of the “cocaine mafia”, showing that positive 
discrimination only leads to trouble.255 In Amsterdam, the construction of artificial islands in 
a canal is regarded as the consequence of overpopulation, leading to the landscape being 
“horrendously mutilated”.256 
 
Language and policy shifts: 
In addition to these similar ideas, there were clear shifts in the CD’s views on problems in 
society, influenced by the volatile transition into the 1990s: The fall of the wall, and the 
increasingly threatening image of Islam, changing governments policies towards immigration 
and the increasing politicisation of this issue both assist and challenge the Centre Democrats’ 
ability to stay electorally attractive. 
With the switch of government policies focused on the integration of immigrants in 
Dutch society, the Centre Democrats became increasingly opposed to integration, as they did 
not want the presence of foreigners in the Netherlands in the first place. Integration was seen 
as a myth: for the Centre Democrats it is impossible to integrate people, as different cultures 
living side by side will always be a problem. Unlike World War Two, these “occupiers” will not 
come “with tanks or fighter jets, but as tourists or fortune seekers” and not for five years “but 
forever”.257 The issue of integration is continuously compared to international developments: 
“The integration of Muslims in the last two hundred years in Bosnia did not succeed”.258 And 
in the United States, the backlog in education has failed after 30 years.259 
The Islam was increasingly a cause for concern: As early as 1986, an article titled “The 
threat of Islam” warns against Islamisation: in Iran “there are examples enough” as there is 
no space for Christianity or humanism.260 The civil war that erupted in Lebanon will allegedly 
also happen in the Netherlands if you would provide voting rights to foreigners.261 The fact 
that “these people” did not apply family planning would allegedly lead to three times as many 
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Muslims every sixteen years.262 In their magazine, the CD discussed barbaric stories of 
Islamisation: “If you are still young, you might become a witness of how a thief will get its 
hand chopped off in public, preferably in front of a mosque.”263 These last two very critical 
articles of Islam were, unsurprisingly, released after the Rushdie-affair, which later is qualified 
as proof of the “lack of tolerance” of Islam.264 In problematising foreigners, the CD made 
direct references to wars: World War Two, the Yugoslav Wars and the civil war in Lebanon.  
The whole problem, according to the CD was that other politicians believe in 
integration: they “cherish dangerous thoughts” because the “society is not makeable. It is 
destroyable.”265 This ‘myth’ was re-emphasised in a later edition: “That integration is a big 
problem is known to everyone. It even looks like an unsolvable problem.”266 The mixing of 
foreigners in Dutch society will make Dutch people go down into a “melting pot of races and 
peoples”.267 According to the CD, the multicultural society is unfixable, and the integration of 
‘foreign elements’ is impossible. This way, the CD persistently opposed all solutions its 
opponents offer. 
As opposed to the Centre party’s and early Centre Democrats’ focus on the ‘liveability’ 
of the Netherlands, the new Centre Democrats were more upset about the alleged 
discrimination of Dutch people. The election programme of the Centre Democrats of 1989 is 
riddled with accusations about the Government’s ‘anti-Dutch policies’.268 In the party 
magazines, this was also a recurrent theme: As early as 1987, an article complains that there 
is austerity on all levels of government spending, but not on foreign aid.269 Also, there is 
money for centres for asylum seekers, but barely any money for cultural activities abroad, like 
a Dutch-Flemish church in Spain.270 This link to asylum seekers came back a lot, unsurprisingly 
in a time when asylum seeker numbers go up. Asylum seekers were presented as highly 
untrustworthy and are called “economic refugees” or “fortune seekers”.271 
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The limits of portraying refugees as undeserving were explored in some of their 
articles. An article from 1989 presents a truly bizarre story: A Turkish man had allegedly gone 
to Africa, had a baby there with a black woman, and was told by a guerrilla fighter to escape 
to the Netherlands as “befriended left-wing organisations would always stand up for 
foreigners, either criminal or not.”272 Furthermore, refugees in general “do not agree with our 
political system and culture at all” especially the communists and Muslims.273 Providing them 
with welfare is not even humane, it would be more humane to create solutions in the country 
of origin.274 These ideas suggest that the Centre Democrats believed that there was no place 
for refugees in the Netherlands. They did not belong here and accommodating them was 
presented is an inhumane act.  
The CD went far with their accusations of ‘discrimination of the Dutch’, and unjust 
favouring of foreigners everywhere. In 1987, the party complained that photos of the Dutch 
national team are overexposed to make dark players more visible and to make white players 
invisible.275 And allegedly, the PvdA wanted to abolish academic titles, to make 
undereducated foreigners feel better: “everything in favour of the intellectually less gifted. 
Who those are in our society is easily guessed: children and adults of other than Western 
cultures.”276  
  At some point, the party started to become more involved in the judicial side of 
politics. In its election programme of 1994, the CD wants to abolish article one, which 
prohibits discrimination.277 This would make it easier to reverse the ‘anti-Dutch policies’. In a 
party magazine of 1993, the CD proposed controversial new laws: It wanted to provide Dutch 
citizenship only at the second or third generation, based on the “degree of rootedness” 
because the protection of a people is a human right.278 In another party magazine later that 
year, the allocation of unemployment benefits is rejected, as these should depend on the 
number of generations a family lives in the Netherlands.279 
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Increased competition and politicisation of immigration 
But increasingly, this era became difficult for the Centre Democrats. They had to deal with 
increased competition for their single issue. This can be read in several of their articles, where 
the party discusses the behaviour of other political parties, who were allegedly saying things 
that the CD would get prosecuted for. This is even presented as a sign of the increased 
influence of the CD.  
In 1992, the VVD voiced their concerns with the increase of Islamic schools: “Maybe 
the CD would already have been sued if they made such statements.”280 The CD presented 
the VVD’s concerns as an adoption of CD-views because VVD-leader Frits Bolkestein made “a 
couple of remarks that are pretty much in line with the CD” in an article titled “increasing 
influence of the CD”.281 In the same article, the CD notes that “even the PvdA makes 
statements, which if to be made by the CD, would be deemed racist.”282 A true tipping point 
in Dutch politics can be identified at the end of 1993: “The CD has broken the taboo on 
discussing immigration policies” – but not thanks to the PvdA, as they have allegedly tried to 
thwart the CD where possible.283 This is shortly before CD’s biggest political victory of 3 seats. 
Striking about the articles in CD-Actueel is that they play with ideas and explore the 
limits to create credible narratives about the party’s impact, the corruptness of politics and 
the media, and the dangers of immigration and Islam. This ‘playing field’ has a link with more 
external communication, as some of their claims later re-emerge in election programmes. It 
also shows that the CD constantly tried to encourage itself and its members, by highlighting 
its political influence. Such self-encouragement is not surprising if one takes into account the 
strong outside pressure on the party. This behaviour can be regarded as a response to their 
difficult and marginal position as a protest party. 
 
The general election of 1994 
The last years of the Centre Movement were characterised by its disintegration. Despite an 
increasingly bad reputation around the year 1994, the party managed to get into parliament 
with 3 seats. This electoral ‘victory’ of 1994 was also a sign of dissatisfaction in the cabinet. 
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The election of 1994 was characterized by a fragmentation of Dutch politics, as the lower 
chamber welcomed twelve parties, compared to nine in the previous election. The labour 
party PvdA and CDA together lost a staggering 32 seats.284 For the first time in decades, a 
cabinet was formed without a confessional party. The lack of political influence at the time 
was described in the infamous opinion piece by historian J.W. Oerlemans titled “Een-
partijstaat Nederland”, criticising the Dutch political elite as an “oligarchy of professional 
politicians”.285 This general dissatisfaction provided a beneficial environment for a protest-
party like the Centre Democrats. 
However, the image of the Centre Democrats is increasingly damaged in the year 
1994. In addition to the damage of undercover reports, judicial authorities initiated multiple 
lawsuits on discrimination-allegations. Hans Janmaat and his wife Wil Schuurmans were 
condemned to heavy fines only one day after the 1994 elections.286 Janmaat was also giving 
a bad reputation to himself. In January 1994 Janmaat had responded indifferently about the 
sudden death of the Minister of Internal Affairs Ien Dales (PvdA).287 At the time, Janmaat had 
told a journalist: “We will not shed a tear.”288 Not beneficial to the party’s reputation were 
the bizarre solutions that it started to offer. In their 1994 election-programme, the CD 
proposes to put refugees into “work camps” where the government can organise projects or 
to force them to fortify dykes.289 
After the 1994 elections, a newspaper reported that all the bad publicity “did not 
make the extreme-right protest voters doubt.”290 In his victory speech, Janmaat even 
responded to the press: “Journalists were only stirring up hatred towards the CD. But even if 
they attack us on television, we won’t flinch. Because despite heavy political attacks, the voter 
believes in the CD. We have not been abandoned.”291 Despite his optimism, everything quickly 
went downhill from here.  
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The last years in parliament  
The parliamentary minutes of 1996 reveal that the party sometimes continues to reproduce 
earlier narratives from their party magazines. It continued on the same paths as observed in 
the analyses above and came with radical solutions. The anti-elitist character dominated 
Janmaat’s performances: it does not matter if the CDA is in the cabinet or not, because 
“differences in policies the CD barely sees.”292 The governing parties were continuously 
presented as incompetent and illegitimate: “The CD has pointed out years ago that the 
cabinet is creating problems that it cannot solve.”293 The solutions that the government offers 
were allegedly to the disadvantage of the native Dutch population: the anti-segregation 
policies to distribute minorities more evenly in cities would cause “an increased risk to 
become the victim of unstoppable criminality.”294 Taking in more asylum seekers in the 
Netherlands would cause big groups of Dutch people to tumble into poverty and according to 
Janmaat this “borders on treason.”295  
The party’s attacks on immigrants also continued in familiar ways: Asylum seekers are 
allegedly welcomed with false (or no) documents.296 And, repeating older claims in the party 
magazines about refugees, Janmaat argued that “terrorists on Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers, 
obtained Dutch foreign aid and used these funds for flights of stranded ‘Tigers’ to the 
Netherlands. The same applied to freedom fighters in Africa.”297 For the Centre Democrats, 
there was only one solution that could stop the major problems facing the Netherlands: “a 
stop on the flow of newcomers. If that doesn’t happen, there isn’t much to solve.”298 
The language towards fellow politicians got much publicity in the press. The CD’s 
radical solutions and provocative statements were in line with the internally discussed 
strategies in the years of BVD-infiltration. In 1995 Janmaat said that he does not find it right 
that a Greek-Dutch MP talks about naturalisation.299 In January 1997, Janmaat sent a letter to 
colleague Broos van Erp in parliament from the VVD who had liver cancer. Janmaat’s letter 
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got attention in the press and was condemned by the VVD. Allegedly, Janmaat was angry that 
he was not informed like other MP’s about Van Erp’s illness and wrote: “It should have been 
expected you would have transcended yourself in this sad situation. But this lesson you have 
not learned yet.”300 
The party took part in the general election of 1998 with a familiar party programme. 
However, there are some surprising additions: the Dutch government should “strive for 
reunification with Flanders and other Dutch-speaking areas.”301 Furthermore, the CD wanted 
to introduce the death penalty and allow guns for shopkeepers. The party is a little more 
careful regarding integration: The CD considers an “amalgamation” of different cultural 
elements possible, but there is one condition: minorities of different cultures can be part of 
that national culture if their “cultural elements are not in conflict with essential elements of 
the Dutch culture.”302 In the 1990s, the party’s attractiveness was increasingly challenged by 
its lack of a ‘normal’ reputation due to the flood of negative publicity. More importantly, the 
stricter immigration and integration policies deeply challenged the Centre Democrats’ single-
issue character and partly removed the incentive to cast a protest vote. Ultimately, the party 
disappears in 1998. In one of the last interviews with Hans Janmaat, he said: “We have never 
noticed that anyone even listened to us for one second.“303 The Centre Movement briefly 
thrived on protest votes. But after years of damage to its – already radical – reputation and 
increasing competition over its single issue, there was no more place for the Centre 
Movement in the Dutch Parliament after 1998. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has attempted to come to a better understanding of the internal functioning of 
the Centre Movement and its attempts to mobilise support through communication 
strategies. Furthermore, it has sought to further clarify the movement’s failure to break out 
of the margins in a time when conditions in the Netherlands were favourable for the 
emergence of an anti-immigration party. 
The movement was controversial from the start and had to find ways to present itself 
as ‘normal’. Internal discussions revealed that the movement was constantly distancing itself 
from radical figures that could damage its image. Another important tactic was to delegitimise 
its opponents and to highlight the movement’s impact on Dutch politics. On the other hand, 
such attempts at saving its image were reversed by premeditated provocative statements and 
publicity stunts. The movement was populist, as it kept emphasising that it was not part of 
the elite, and that it could stand up for the disadvantaged native Dutch population. The radical 
figures that the movement associated with made it almost impossible to attain a ‘normal’ 
image. Furthermore, the movement was constantly looking for the limits of problematising 
immigration. An important strategy to mobilise support was the expanding of local issues to 
the alleged threat of immigration. Or by linking events abroad to the problems of the 
multicultural society and the ‘myth’ of integration. Key to these aspects is their balancing of 
moderation and provocation. They were not completely out of control, despite their radical 
reputation. On the other hand, they were not as innocent as some of the more recent 
literature on the Centre Movement suggests. 
This shows that organisations, not limited to the AIPs might present reckless and 
provocative behaviour on the external level while being fully aware of their actions. The 
Centre Movement’s strength came from its position outside of the ‘establishment’ as this 
attracted hundreds of thousands of protest voters. Despite great ambitions, especially in the 
early years of the movement, the internal discussions suggest that the Centre Movement was 
aware of its limited position as a protest party, hence its persistent and ‘clumsy’ provocative 
behaviour. This apparent nonchalance was often the result of carefully designed actions. 
The success of AIPs is highly depended on three factors; issue-ownership, ideological 
attractiveness and partisan collaboration. It has become apparent that the Centre Movement 
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scored badly on these factors, as it merely attracted protest votes due to its narrow anti-
immigration ideology. An increasingly bad image and political exclusion perpetuated its 
marginal existence. Even though there were ambitions to step away from its single issue in an 
attempt to become a ‘normal’ movement and break out of the margins of politics, this never 
happened. This is because of its paradoxical nature as a protest movement. 
On the one hand, its radical character enabled the movement to receive protest votes. 
It could not become too radical, as this would discourage all potential voters. On the other 
hand, deradicalising would potentially cause protest voters to walk away. Political exclusion 
made deradicalisation even more unlikely, as this exclusion removed the incentive to come 
to political compromises. This means the Centre Movement was stuck in a position between 
radicalism and moderation. After the surprising results on the local and national level in the 
early 1990s, the party managed to fulfil its merit: ‘scare’ the elite. This temporary rise in 
support did not necessarily mean that voters agreed with the solutions the Centre Democrats 
offered. With the increasingly questionable reputation of the party, the simultaneous 
politicisation of immigration and tougher stance by more reputable political actors, the 
Centre Movement lost its raison d'être. 
Similar to the ‘radicalisation’ of conservative parties in the 1970s, the relatively long 
presence of a radical AIP in the Dutch Parliament might have broadened the political spectrum 
and changed views on what can be considered as ‘unacceptable’ anti-immigration positions. 
The tougher stance on immigration by mainstream parties in the 1990s was more acceptable 
when compared to the radical and provocative position of the Centre Movement. This shows 
how AIPs such as the Centre Movement operate in the margins of politics. Their power is 
limited to their influence on policies of governing parties by attracting enough protest votes. 
Because the language and critical attitude towards immigration have been adopted by 
mainstream actors to an important extent, the existence of the Centre Movement might have 
been more influential on Dutch politics than much of the existing literature acknowledges.  
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